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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plain tiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 18083 
ZOLLA HALES, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
---0000000---
STATE:MENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a violation of 
§ 76-8-412 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). Appellant claims this 
statute is improperly applied since the same conduct is pro-
scribed by § 76-6-504, a Class B misdemeanor. Appellant 
also claims that reversible error was committed at trial by 
the state prosecutor. This Third Degree felony was first 
prosecuted in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County and was tried before a jury on August 19th and 20th, 
1981. The trial resulted in a conviction and a judgment by 
Judge J. Robert Bullock after referral of the Defendant to 
the adult probation and parole board. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and convic-
tion and a re-trial under the correct section of the Utah 
Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Zolla Hales, was employed by the Town of 
Oak Ridge, formerly Salem Hills, as Town Recorder from 
December 1976 until January 1980, at which time she was to 
turn the office over to a newly appointed Recorder. On 
February 11, 1980, while the books were being prepared for 
an audit prior to their transfer to the new Recorder, some 
of the books and records were destroyed by fire at Mrs. 
Hales' residence. After contacting her husband, Mrs. Hales 
waited a short while until he arrived home and attempted to 
contact other members of the Town Council, but was unsuccess-
ful. She then contacted the new Recorder who also came to 
the Hales' residence. ..After her arrival, Mr. Hales contacted 
the Mayor who in turn called the Sheriff's Office and the 
County Fire Marshall. Subsequently, the damage was inspected 
by the Mayor, a Deputy Sheriff, the town volunteer fire chief, 
and the State Fire Marshall, and the charges were then raised 
against Mrs. Hales under.§ 76-8-412 Utah Code Annotated. 
Defendant submitted a motion to dismiss the information based 
on the fact that the overlapping statutes § 76-6-504 and 
§ 76-8-412 U.C.A. imposed different penalties for the same 
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conduct and Defendant was charged under the statute 
imposing the greater penalty. The motion was denied. 
Defendant also submitted jury instructions to the effect 
that the correct choice of laws was a jury question. 
However, those instructions were not given, and trial 
proceeded exclusively under.§ 76-8-412 U.C .A. Although 
Defendant maintained that the fire was accidental, the 
trial resulted in a conviction under the specified code 
section. Ttis is an appeal of that conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR ABOUT THE DEFENDAi\JT' S 
CHOICE NOT TO TESTIFY VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S FIFTH 
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In a 1965 landmark decision in Griffin v California, 
380 U.S. 609 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
comments by the prosecutor about the failure of a Defen-
dant to testify can effectively abridge the Defendant's 
Fifth Amendment rights to refuse to testify and therefore 
can constitute reversible error. At the same time the 
Supreme Court decided that this principle applied to 
state criminal trials by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
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We said in Malloy v Hogan, supra, p. 11, 
that "the same standards must determine 
whether an accused's silence in either a 
fedei-:-al or state proceeding is justified. " 
We take that in its literal sense and hold 
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct 
application to the Federal Government, and 
in its bearing on the States by reason of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either 
comment by the prosecution on the accused's 
silence or instructions by the court that 
such silence is evidence of guilt. 380 U.S. 
at 615. 
The reason the prosecutor cannot properly comment on 
the De£endant's failure to testify is clearly stated in 
Griffin. A rule allowing prosecutor comments "[I]s in 
substance a rule of evidence that allows the state the 
privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration 
the failure of the accused to testify. Ko formal offer 
of proof is made as in other situations, but the prosecu-
tion's comments and the Court's acquiescence are the equiv-
alent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance." 380 
U.S. at 613. 
This is further clarified by the Supreme Court in Wilson 
v United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893): 
It is not every one who can safely venture on 
the witness stand thougt entirely innocent of 
the charge against him. Excessive timidity, 
nervousness when facing others and attemptina 
to explain transactions of a suspicious char~ 
acter, and offenses charged against him, will 
often confuse and embarrass him to such a 
degree as to increase rather than remove prej-
udices against him. It is not every one, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
however honest, who would, therefore, 
willingly be placed on the witness 
stand. The statute in tenderness to the 
weakness of those who from the causes men-
tioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, 
particularly when they may have been in 
some degree compromised by their associa-
tion with others, declares that the failure 
of the defendant in a criminal action to 
request to be a witness shall not create 
any presumption against him. 149 U.S. at 66. 
The Court in Griffin goes on to say, "If the words 
'Fifth Amendment' are substituted for 'act' and for 
'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
is reflected; for cormnent on the refusal to testify is 
a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' 
Murphy v Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, which the 
Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by 
courts for exercising a constituti~nal privilege. It cuts 
do"WTI. on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 380 
U.S. at 613, 614. 
Conrrnents by the prosecutor which violate Zolla Hales' 
Fifth Amendment privilege are found in two places in the 
transcript of the trial. First, in commenting on the testi-
many of the Defendant's husband, the prosecutor makes a 
clear allusion to the Defendant's failure to testify, and 
thereby implies that her purpose was to conceal something. 
His statement was as follows, "Now, with regard to t~r. Hales' 
testimony, he has not been accused in this case, he's not on 
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trial, but he wasn't even a witness to the burning or 
to the aftermath of the burning, the immediate aftermath. 
But yet he is the one who tells the story." Transcript 
at 128. 
Second, the prosecutor made a much more prejudicial 
comment when he stated the following: 
Now the only testimony, really, if testimony 
it is regarding how it occurred, how the 
burning occurred, comes from the statement 
of the Defendant that you will have as an 
exhibi~ She would be the only one to come 
in and say how it happened, because appar-
ently her husband was not home at the time, 
and yet he's the one who testifies as to 
what occurred. Now it seems to me the refen-
dant' s argument to you is asking you to abso-
lutely disregard your senses with regard to 
who has proved what. I'm surprised he made 
no comment on the issue of motive. Ttat's 
strange. Transcript at 142, 143. 
These remarks are remarkably similar to some of the com-
ments made by the prosecutor in the Griffin case. Some 
of these comments were as follows: 
"The defendant certainly knows whether 
Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at 
the time he left her apartment and went 
down the alley with her .... 
"These things he has not seen fit to take 
the stand and deny or explain. 
'~nd in the whole world, if anybody would 
know, this Defendant would know. 
"Essie Hae is dead, she can't tell you her 
side of the story. The defendant won't." 
380 U.S. at 610, 611. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court found that such comments were 
not permissible and were of a nature to require reversal 
of a murder conviction. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v Nomeland, 581 P.2d 
1010 (Utah 1978), made clear that it supports the Griffin 
case with the following statement: 
A number of states have considered the prob-
lem, but the thrust of the better-reasoned 
cases is set out in State v Jefferson, 
wherein it was said: "In order that there 
be a violation of Griffin, it must.appear 
that the language used by the prosecutor ... 
was manifestly intended or was of such char-
acter that a.jury would naturally and neces-
sarily construe to amount to a connnent on 
the failure of the accused to te~tify.o .. " 
581 P.2d at 1011. 
This Court also qualified its support of the Griffin 
doctrine by stating in State v Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
1977): 
Accepting the proposition that the remarks 
complained of were improper, the question of 
more grave concern is whether, in the light 
of the total picture as presented in this case, 
that impropriety should be regarded as a pre-
judicial error and justify reversal of the 
conviction. We note our awareness that there 
should be no such reversal merely to criticize 
a prosecutor who, perhaps in the ardor of 
advocacy in the trial, oversteps the bounds of 
propriety, nor merely because error has been 
committed. Id., at 1116. 
The Ccurt further stated: 
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[W]e believe that, on appeal, when there is 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the error 
below was prejudicial, that doubt shoul~ b~ 
resolved in favor of the defendant. This is 
especially true where the error involved is 
one which transgresses against the exercise 
of a constitutional right. Consequently, the 
rule which we have numerous times stated is 
that if the error is such as to justify a 
belief that it had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the defendant's right to a fair 
trial, in that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that in its absence there may have been 
a different result, then the error should not 
be regarded as harmless; and conversely, if 
the error is such that it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it was harmless in that 
the result would have been the same, then the 
error should not be deemed prejudicial and 
warrant granting a new trial. Id., at 1116. 
In light of the evidence offered by the State against 
Zolla Hales, the outcome of the trial could well have been 
different in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial 
comments. This is especially obvious when the testimony 
of the arson investigator is reviewed. It can be found 
from page 75 to page 86 of the trial transcript. 
Therefore, the connnents made by the prosecutor were 
prejudicial and violated the defendants constitutional 
right to remain silent, and are grounds for reversal of 
the Defendant's conviction. 
POINT II 
SECTIONS 76-6-504 U.r..A. AND 76-8-412 U.C.A. ARE 
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OVERLAPPING STATUTES PROSCRIBING THE SAME CONDUCT AND 
THEREFORE ONLY THE STATUTE IMPOSING A LESSER PENALTY CAN 
APPLY. 
A settled point of law in Utah is that when more than 
one statute proscribes the same or similar conduct, only 
the statute which carries the lesser sentence may be im-
posed. See, State v Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 
146 (1969); State v Loveless, 581 P.2d 585 (Utah 1978). 
The Utah Legislature codified this principle in § 77-17-1 
U.C.A. (as amended 1953) which states as follows: 
When it appears the defendant has committed a 
public.offense and there is reasonable doubt 
as to which of two or more degrees he is 
guilty, he shall be convicted only of the lower 
degree. 
This principle is solidly based on the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. To allow the courts to apply indiscrirnin-
ately or on the whim of the prosecutor either of two over-
lapping statutes which carry different penalties for the 
same offense would be a clear violation of equal protect-
ion. State v Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 345, 453 P.2d 
146' 148 (196 9) ' 
Since Shondell, the Utah Supreme Court has consist-
ently applied this principle of law. Examples of this 
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application are cases such as State v Fair, 23 Utah 2d 
34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969), in which this Court imposed the 
lesser of two sentences prescribed by two separate but 
overlapping statutes. In other cases such as Ranrrnell v 
Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) this Court has refused 
to impose the lesser of two penalties prescribed by dif-
ferent statutes but only because the two related statutes 
did not deal with the same conduct. 
In § 76-6-504 of the Utah Code, it states: 
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to 
do so, knowingly falsifies, destroys, 
removes, or conceals any writings, ... or 
record, public or private, with intent to 
deceive or injure any person or to conceal 
any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with 
records. 
(2) Tampering with records is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
In§ 76-8-412 of the Utah Code, it states: 
Every officer having the custody of any 
record, map, or book, or of any paper or 
proceedings of any court, filed or depos-
ited in any public office, or placed in 
his hands for any purpose, who is guilty 
of stealing, willfully destroying, mutila-
ting, defacing, altering, falsifying, 
removing, or secreting the whole or any 
part thereof, or who permits any other 
person so to do, is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree. 
Section 76-8-412 noted above is followed by § 76-8-413, 
which simply states that it is a Class A misdemeanor for 
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someone not in official custody of public records to do 
the same acts specified in § 76-8-412 of the Code. Sec-
tion 76-6-504 and sections 76-8-412 and 413 proscribe 
virtually identical conduct - the destruction of public 
records. Section 76-6-504 U.C.A. makes the destruction 
of public records a Class B misdemeanor, where § 76-8-412 
makes it a Third Degree felony. Surprisingly, the require-
ments of proof for the misdemeanor are more strict than 
those for the felony. Section 76-6-504 requires proof 
that the destruction of the records by any person be with 
the intent of concealing some wrongdoing or of deceiving 
or injuring any person. Section 76-8-412 requires simply 
that the records be willfully destroyed by someone holding 
them in an official capacity. In the absence of § 76-8-413, 
a case could be made for the proposition that the legisla-
ture simply meant to punish a custodian more severely. 
Reading §§ 412 and 413 together, however, defeats that pos-
sibility. The conduct sought to be prohibited by both 
statutory schemes is the destruction of public records. 
Both of these overlapping statutes apply equally well to 
Zolla Hales if either one in fact applies. This is sup-
ported by the prosector in his conunents on page 130 of 
the tr{al transcript where he says, "It is the state's 
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contention, it is our contention that the evidence will 
show that this fire was deliberately set to cover up 
d Th ' h t" " earlier wrong oings. at s t ~e mo ive. 
The distinction dravm by the legislature between 
these two statutes is insufficient to mandate the applica-
tion of one of these two statutes in preference to the 
other, therefore, the statute with the lesser penalty 
must apply. In the Shondell case, the justification for 
applying the lesser penalty was much less clear than in 
this case. The act which imposed a misdemeanor penalty 
for its violation, § 58-33-4(a), states clearly in another 
section, § 58-33-6(g), that when an offense under that act 
was also prohibited under any other statute, "that offense 
shall not be punishable under this act, but under such 
other provision of law." The same activities with which 
the Defendant was charged in Shondell were also prohibited 
under § 58-13a-2 U.C.A. and a significantly heavier penalty 
was provided. However, this court found it necessary, in 
spite of § 58-33-6(g) to choose between the overlapping 
statutes and to choose the statute with the lesser penalty. 
In the two overlapping statutes, §§ 76-6-504 and 
76-8-412, which prohibit the destruction of public records 
but which impose significantly different punishments, there 
is no applicable section similar to § 58-33-6(g). Therefore, 
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only § 76-6-504 should apply. 
As· this Court said in Shondell: 
The well-established rule is that a 
statute creating a crime should be 
sufficiently certain that persons of 
ordinary intelligence who desire to 
obey the law may know how to conduct 
themselves in conformity with it. A 
fair and logical concommittant of that 
rule is that such a penal statute 
should be similarly clear, specific 
and understandable as to the penalty 
imposed for its violation. 453 P.2d at 
148. 
That basic rule of law would make it impossible to 
sustain either § 76-6-504 or § 76-8-412 in the absence of 
§ 77-17-1 U.C.A. which states: 
When it appears the defendant has committed 
a public offense and there is reasonable 
doubt as to which of two or more degrees he 
is guilty, he shall b~ convicted only of the 
lower degree. 
Therefore, if either statute applies in this case, only 
the Class B misdemeanor of § 76-6-504 could apply to the 
Defendant Zolla Hales. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the prejudicial statements made before the 
jury by the prosecutor, the court srnuld reverse the con-
viction of Zolla Hales and order a new trial, and because 
of the overlapping statutes applicable to this case, the 
court should also order that only§. 76-6-504 U.C.A. should 
apply in any further proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this tl 8: day of February, 
. {2t_; 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, 
to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, Attorney for Plain-
tiff and Respondent, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this ?U'\ day of February, 1982. 
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